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Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is 
Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment 
ELIZABETH BENNION* 
To be kept in solitude is to be kept in pain, and put on the road to madness. 
– E.O. Wilson1 
The United States engages in extreme practices of solitary confinement that 
maximize isolation and sensory deprivation of prisoners. The length is often indefinite 
and can stretch for weeks, months, years, or decades. Under these conditions, both 
healthy prisoners and those with preexisting mental-health issues often severely 
deteriorate both mentally and physically. New science and data provide increased 
insight into why and how human beings (and other social animals) deteriorate and 
suffer in such environments. The science establishes that meaningful social contacts 
and some level of opportunity for sensory enrichment are minimum human necessities. 
When those necessities are denied, the high risks of serious harm apply to all prisoners, 
no matter how seemingly resilient beforehand. Given these facts, this Article argues 
that solitary confinement, as commonly practiced in the United States, is cruel and 
unusual punishment—whether analyzed under current Supreme Court standards or an 
improved framework. Furthermore, recently released data on states implementing 
reforms shows that extreme solitary confinement tactics are counterproductive to 
numerous policy interests, including public safety, institutional safety, prisoner 
welfare, and cost efficiency. Both the scientific and the policy data suggest possible 
avenues for effective reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the door is locked against the prisoner, we do not think about what is behind it. . . . 
Were we to enter the hidden world of punishment, we should be startled by what we see. 
– Justice Anthony Kennedy2 
The largest prisoner hunger strike in California’s history lasted sixty days and 
ended on September 5, 2013.3 Involving approximately thirty thousand prisoners at 
its peak, the protest’s central demand was over the state’s use of indefinite solitary 
confinement that allows prisoners to be held for years, and even decades, in 
isolation.4 As the strike stretched into its second month, dozens had been sent to 
hospitals and infirmaries.5 By the final week, “nearly 10 protesters a day were 
collapsing or otherwise required medical care.”6 The strikers won no major 
concessions regarding solitary confinement but did gain the promise of legislative 
hearings. At the end of the strike, protest leaders released a statement: “Our goal 
remains: Force the powers that be to end their torture policies and practices in which 
serious physical and psychological harm is inflicted on tens of thousands of 
prisoners, as well as our loved ones outside.”7 
While the strikers failed to accomplish their central goals, the strike did focus 
national and international attention on the most troubling aspect of a deeply troubled 
penal system. Solitary confinement, as currently practiced in the United States, 
represents a serious miscalculation of the appropriate balance among prison security, 
public safety, cost efficiency, and prisoner welfare. Indeed, the extreme solitary 
confinement measures in this country promote none of those interests. The measures 
also violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 
because they deny prisoners what science indicates are minimum human necessities. 
Conditions of solitary confinement vary throughout the United States. But it is not 
uncommon for prisoners to spend decades alone in windowless cement rooms with 
perimeters approximately the size of a parking space or a king-sized bed for 
twenty-three hours a day. Their meals may be pushed through slots of large, solid 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the American 
Bar Association Annual Meeting 3 (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://apps.americanbar.org
/irr/annual2003/kennedyspeech.pdf). 
 3. Paige St. John, California State Prisons Chief Says Inmates’ Hunger Strike Has 
Ended, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-ff-prisons
-chief-says-hunger-strike-has-ended-20130905,0,345517.story. 
 4. Paige St. John, Outside Look at Prison Hunger Strike, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2013, at 1. 
 5. Sharon Bernstein, California Grapples with Inmate Illness as Hunger Strike Drags On, 
NBCNEWS.COM, Aug. 16, 2013, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/16/20051427
-california-grapples-with-inmate-illness-as-hunger-strike-drags-on?lite. 
 6. Paige St. John, State Prison Hunger Strike Ends, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at 1. 
 7. Id. 
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metal doors—thus they eat, sleep, and defecate in spaces within a few feet of each 
other.8 The one-hour “exercise” time might be in a cage on a concrete slab or in a 
small, barren, concrete-enclosed pen that prisoners call a “dog run.”9 Prisoners may 
go years without seeing more of the outdoors than a small patch of sky and without 
being physically touched by another human being other than when placed in 
constraints, such as handcuffs and chains.10 While they may hear echoing shouts of 
other prisoners, there is no opportunity for normal conversation or association with 
others from the confines of their cells.11 They generally also have no access to 
rehabilitative programs.12 It is important to note at the outset that when this Article 
speaks of “solitary confinement,” it is not simply referring to housing an inmate in 
his or her own single-occupancy cell—it is referring to all these associated types of 
extreme measures to provide isolation and sensory deprivation. 
In this extreme environment, many prisoners suffer serious psychological and 
physical deterioration. Prisoners entering solitary confinement with mental-health 
issues often find those issues severely exacerbated. Prisoners entering without 
mental-health issues often acquire acute mental illness during their stay.13 In 
California, 2% of the prison population is housed in isolation, and yet that 2% 
accounted for 42% of all prison suicides from 2006 to 2010.14 Long-term isolation 
can also contribute to dramatically increased costs and increased “assaultive or anti-
social behavior”; it can “result in negative outcomes for institutional safety, and 
increase the risk of recidivism after release.”15 
Given the extremely negative effects of solitary confinement on prisoners 
themselves and on larger policy goals, there has been a growing groundswell for 
reform—spurred at least in part by a much smaller prisoner hunger strike in 2011.16 
For example, the U.S. Senate held its first congressional hearings on the issue in June 
2012 and February 2014, with the lead senator calling for reforms.17 The U.N. special 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Reassessing Solitary 
Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 20–21 (2012) [hereinafter Solitary Confinement Hearing I] (statement 
of Craig Haney, Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz). 
 9. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” 
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 126, 126 (2003). 
 10. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 20 (statement of Craig Haney, 
Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz). 
 11. Haney, supra note 9, at 127. 
 12. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1262. 
 13. Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. POL’Y 
325, 333 (2006) (“I have observed that, for many of the inmates so housed, incarceration in 
solitary caused either severe exacerbation or recurrence of preexisting illness, or the appearance 
of acute mental illness in individuals who had previously been free of any such illness.”). 
 14. Editorial, Striking Against Solitude, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2013, at A18. 
 15. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 712 (written statement of Michael 
Jacobson, President and Director, Vera Institute of Justice). 
 16. See California Prison Hunger Strike: 30,000 Inmates Refuse Meals, HUFFINGTON 
POST (July 10, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/09/california-prison
-hunger-strike-30000_n_3567639.html. 
 17. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8; Reassessing Solitary Confinement II: The 
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rapporteur on torture urged the United States to abolish prolonged solitary 
confinement (defined as anything more than fifteen days)—which he argued could 
amount to torture.18 Other influential organizations voicing opposition to the current 
state of affairs include the American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the European Court 
for Human Rights, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the 
National Alliance of Mental Illness, the Vera Institute of Justice, and others.19 
Several states have begun reforms, but many resist the growing tide of change.20  
Thus, at least parts of the nation seem presently poised for genuine reform efforts. 
But there are obstacles to those reform efforts as well: creating more humane 
conditions for prisoners is not generally seen as a popular position for politicians; 
among the general population, there is a lack of scientific understanding regarding 
the extent and severity of solitary confinement’s potential effects; a culture of harsh 
punishment predominates in many modern prisons;21 and there is a widespread 
legislative and judicial hesitancy to interfere with matters of prison security and 
administration—presumably over fear of unforeseen results. So, for example, one 
federal judge found that certain solitary-confinement conditions did “press the outer 
bounds of what most humans can psychologically tolerate,” and yet he refused to 
find the conditions cruel and unusual for all inmates.22 It is this type of hesitancy that 
                                                                                                                 
 
Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014), 
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/reassessing-solitary-confinement-ii-the
-human-rights-fiscal-and-public-safety-consequences. 
 18. Press Release, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, California Jails: “Solitary 
Confinement Can Amount to Cruel Punishment, Even Torture”—UN Rights Expert (Aug. 23, 
2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID
=13655&LangID=E (quoting Special Rapporteur Juan E. Mendez). 
 19. See, e.g., Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and 
Prisoner Interests in Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 
1825–26 (2012); see also Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at III–V. 
 20. See ACLU, STATE REFORMS TO LIMIT THE USE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (2013), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/state_reforms_to_limit_the_use_of_solitary
_confinement.pdf; Sal Rodriguez, FAQ, SOLITARY WATCH (2012), http://solitarywatch.com
/facts/faq/. 
 21. Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Mississippi, has 
become a proponent of reform and was one of those called to testify before the Senate Hearing 
on Solitary Confinement in June 2012, but he admitted that at one time he did believe difficult 
inmates should be locked down as tightly as possible for as long as possible: “That was the 
culture, and I was part of it,” he said. Erica Goode, Rethinking Solitary Confinement: States 
Ease Isolation, Saving Money, Lives and Inmate Sanity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at A1. 
 22. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The judge who refused 
to find the conditions cruel and unusual for all inmates housed in a particular prison’s solitary 
confinement stressed that the opinion was 
based on the current record and data before us. We can not begin to speculate on 
the impact that [these solitary] conditions may have on inmates confined . . . for 
periods of 10 or 20 years or more; the inmates studied in connection with this 
action had generally been confined . . . for three years or less. 
Id. 
At the time that opinion was written, the “record and data” were necessarily limited because 
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likely prompted Justice Kennedy’s admonition that “[c]ourts may not allow 
constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve 
intrusion into the realm of prison administration.”23 
This Article addresses these obstacles by examining the increasing scientific 
evidence of the severely debilitating effects of isolation and sensory deprivation, 
explaining why the science requires finding the current practices cruel and unusual, 
and discussing the emerging data regarding the societal effects of reform. This is a 
particularly opportune time to make the analysis due to the explosive growth in 
neuroscientific research, the wealth of evidence produced from a variety of sources 
for the 2012 and 2014 Senate hearings, and the recent reform efforts of some states 
that provide new insight regarding societal effects of a change in course. The data 
also suggests what types of reforms could effectively redefine solitary-confinement 
policies within constitutional bounds. 
This Article first examines the history of U.S. solitary confinement, including why 
a penal system that is desperately overcrowded and underfunded turned to a method 
that exacerbates both crowding and cost issues. Part III considers the effects of 
isolation and sensory deprivation, drawing on both studies of prisoners and studies 
of humans and animals in other contexts of isolation. It highlights that there is 
increasingly no clear line between physical and psychological harm. Part IV explains 
the jurisprudence surrounding the Eighth Amendment as it applies to prison 
conditions and some potential improvements. It then argues that under either the 
current or an improved standard, solitary confinement (as commonly currently 
practiced in the United States) is cruel and unusual. This argument is based on the 
scientific evidence that extreme isolation and sensory deprivation constitute a denial 
of minimum human necessities. Part V examines alternative solutions, including 
evidence from recent experiments with reforming solitary-confinement programs 
and the effect on different policy interests. The Article concludes with proposed 
changes that would appropriately balance prison-security needs with public safety, 
public funding, and prisoner-welfare obligations, while avoiding cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibitions. 
I. THE HISTORY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
I believe that very few men are capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and 
agony which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon the sufferers . . . . I 
                                                                                                                 
 
the prison facility at issue had only existed for approximately five years. Id. at 1155. But by 2011, 
more than five hundred inmates in that same facility had spent over a decade in solitary 
confinement, more than two hundred had spent more than fifteen years there, and seventy-eight 
had been there more than twenty years. AMNESTY INT’L., USA: THE EDGE OF ENDURANCE: PRISON 
CONDITIONS IN CALIFORNIA’S SECURITY HOUSING UNITS 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/edgeofendurancecaliforniareport.pdf. Louisiana 
holds the record for the longest terms served in solitary confinement in the United States. 
Herman Wallace’s forty-one years in isolation ended in October 2013 when his conviction 
was overturned—he died a few days later. His codefendant, Albert Woodfox, also had his 
conviction overturned but remains in solitary confinement pending the state’s appeal. David 
Cole, Decades in Solitary, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2013, at A19. 
 23. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928−29 (2011). 
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hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse 
than any torture of the body . . . . 
– Charles Dickens after an 1842 visit to the Cherry Hill prison, which was 
experimenting with extreme isolation techniques24 
There are a host of names for it: the bing, the hole, the hotbox, the SHU (Secure 
Housing Unit), the block, the cooler, the pound, lockdown, 23/7, SCU (Solitary 
Confinement Unit), Administrative Segregation (AdSeg), isolation, separation, cellular, 
Supermax (Super-Maximum Security Confinement), communications-management 
unit, control unit, disciplinary-housing unit, intensive-management unit, special 
management, security housing, close management, high security, closed-cell restriction, 
etc.25 The precise number of inmates housed at any one time in solitary confinement 
in the United States is unknown—but in 2005, it was a number well over 80,000.26 
That figure qualifies the United States as holding “far more prisoners in segregation 
or solitary than any other democratic nation.”27 
It was not always thus. The first experiments with long-term isolation in the 
United States were associated with the idea that forcing an inmate into silence and 
moral reflection would aid in rehabilitation and reformation of the prisoner. 
Philadelphia opened Eastern State Penitentiary (or “Cherry Hill”) in 1826 using the 
“silent system,” where prisoners were forbidden to speak, kept alone in their cells, 
and required to wear hoods over their heads during exercise. The Cherry Hill model 
was an “international sensation”—inspiring similar models across the nation and 
around the globe.28 
But the fad did not last long. First, the prisons were extremely expensive to 
maintain. Second, officials and visitors noted extensive mental-health issues among 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 146–47 (John S. 
Whitley & Arnold Goldman eds., Penguin Books 1972) (1842). 
 25. See, e.g., Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 83 (written statement of 
Craig Haney, Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz); U.N. Special 
Rapporteur, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at 8–9, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011); Ken 
Strutin, Solitary Confinement, LLRX.COM (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.llrx.com/features
/solitaryconfinement.htm. 
 26. According to a 2005 Bureau of Justice Statistics census (the most recent data 
available), the number of people held in solitary confinement was 81,622. But this number did 
not include detention centers, Immigration and Customs Enforcement facilities, Bureau of 
Indian Affairs facilities, U.S. Marshals Service facilities, military facilities, and facilities that 
house only juveniles. It included data from all federal facilities and forty-nine state facilities. 
See Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 711 (written statement of Michael 
Jacobson, President and Director, Vera Institute of Justice); Angela Browne, Alissa Cambier 
& Suzanne Agha, Prisons Within Prisons: The Use of Segregation in the United States, 24 
FED. SENT’G REP. 46 (2011). 
 27. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Dick 
Durbin, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights). 
 28. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth 
Amendment Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with 
a Mental Illness, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012) (quoting NORMAN JOHNSTON, FORMS OF 
CONSTRAINT: A HISTORY OF PRISON ARCHITECTURE 74 (2000)). 
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the populations of these new types of prisons. In the 1830s, there were reports of 
hallucinations, dementia, and monomania in Cherry Hill prisoners.29 A prison that 
had adopted the Cherry Hill model in Britain reported that “a very extraordinary 
increase ha[d] taken place in the number of insane prisoners in the prison” and 
recommended that inmates “should be placed together and ‘have the privilege of 
conversation.’”30 Following an 1831 visit to a New York prison experimenting with 
isolation, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: “This absolute solitude, if nothing interrupts 
it, is beyond the strength of man. . . . It does not reform, it kills.”31 
This combination of expense and disturbing mental health effects caused “every 
state that tried the Pennsylvania model between 1830 and 1880 [to] subsequently 
abandon[] it within a few years,”32 except Cherry Hill itself, which continued its 
model until 1913. It seemed the United States had tried a failed experiment and would 
not repeat it. Indeed, in 1890 the Supreme Court observed that society had found 
prolonged solitary confinement to be “too severe.”33 Speaking of several states’ 
experiments with isolation of prisoners, the Court explained: 
But experience demonstrated that there were serious objections to it. A 
considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, 
into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to 
arouse them, and others became violently insane, others, still, committed 
suicide, while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally 
reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to 
be of any subsequent service to the community.34 
Further evidence that made it seem prolonged solitary confinement was 
permanently in the nation’s past included a 1939 prison psychiatric report declaring 
the practice to be no longer adopted in any “civilized nation.”35 And the American 
Correctional Association’s 1959 Manual of Correctional Standards instructed that 
solitary confinement should only be used as a last resort and never last more than 
fifteen days; usually, a much shorter period would be sufficient. It also stressed that 
even during these relatively short periods of isolation, prisoners must be provided 
with group or individual therapy to safeguard mental health.36 
Given prolonged solitary confinement’s dismal record, why did the United States 
once again turn to its widespread use beginning in the 1980s? There were four 
important and interrelated precursors, the first being the explosive growth of the 
prisoner population beginning in the late 1970s. In 1978, there were 307,276 inmates 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Id. at 11. 
 30. Id. (quoting Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison 
Inmates: A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 458 (2006)). 
 31. Ruth Marcus, Why Are We Subjecting Our Youths to Solitary Confinement?, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 16, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-16/opinions/35501106_1
_solitary-confinement-new-york-prison-adult-facilities (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville). 
 32. Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 11–12. 
 33. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 12. 
 36. Id. 
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in state and federal prisons37—a number that had held relatively stable for fifty 
years.38 By the end of 2012, that number was 1,571,013—an increase of over 400 
percent.39 Add in the local-jail figures, and the number increases to over 2.3 million 
people.40 Thus, although the United States has only 5% of the world’s population, it 
has 25% of the world’s prisoners. Those 2.3 million represent by far the most 
prisoners per capita of any democratic nation in the world.41 In 2009, a study reported 
that one in every thirty-one adults in the United States was in prison, on probation, 
or on parole.42 
Funding for larger prisons, more prisons, and more staff did not keep pace with this 
dramatic increase in population.43 Prisons across the nation deal with severe 
overcrowding issues. A 2014 report stated that federal facilities in fiscal-year 2013 
operated at 36% above capacity, and high- and medium-security facilities operated at 
52% and 45% above capacity respectively.44 States from coast to coast are also dealing 
with severe overcrowding—most notoriously California, which is currently being 
forced by the U.S. Supreme Court to reduce its population to 137.5 percent of capacity.45 
Another important precursor to the resurrection of prolonged isolation was the 
widespread closing of mental-health hospitals that began around the 1960s and 
prompted the creation of a new term in the 1990s: “transinstitutionalization,” 
meaning the transfer of mentally ill patients from state hospitals to jails.46 Currently, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Erica Goode, U.S. Prison Populations Decline, Reflecting New Approach to Crime, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A11. 
 38. See Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 13. 
 39. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2012—ADVANCE COUNTS (2013), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12ac.pdf. In 2009, that number reached a high of 
1,615,487—the last several years have shown an overall decline. See id. 
 40. See TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2012—STATISTICAL TABLES (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/jim12st.pdf. 
 41. See Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 30–31. 
 42. Solomon Moore, Study Shows High Cost of Criminal Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
3, 2009, at A13. 
 43. See J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive Coma, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 829, 832 (2002) 
(citing Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, at 51). 
 44. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION 
BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS (2014), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf. However, at the 2014 Senate hearing, the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons stated that currently the federal system operates at 
32% above capacity generally and 51% above capacity in high-security prisons. Reassessing 
Solitary Confinement II: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media
/doc/02-25-14SamuelsTestimony.pdf (statement of Charles E. Samuels, Jr., Director, Federal 
Bureau of Prisons). 
 45. Adam Banner, Stitching Up a Paper Cut: Eric Holder Is ‘Fixing’ a Federal Problem 
at the Expense of the States, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2013, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-banner/eric-holder-drug-policy_b_3758421.html. 
 46. Elizabeth Bennion, A Right To Remain Psychotic? A New Standard for Involuntary 
Treatment in Light of Current Science, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 261 (2013). 
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the three largest inpatient psychiatric facilities in the country are not hospitals, but 
jails: Los Angeles County Jail, Rikers Island Jail in New York, and Cook County Jail 
in Illinois.47 In 2012, one Chicago sheriff lamented that his jail housed two thousand 
mentally ill prisoners, while the largest state mental-health facility had only 582 
beds—and he predicted the situation would soon worsen with the city’s imminent 
plan to shut down six of its twelve mental-health centers.48 A mentally ill person is 
three times more likely to be incarcerated than hospitalized in the United States.49 A 
2006 Bureau of Justice Statistics report stated that 56% of state prisoners, 45% of 
federal prisoners, and 64% of local jail inmates had mental-health problems.50 The 
rate of those with severe mental illness is lower—in 2000, the American Psychiatric 
Association estimated up to 20% of prisoners were severely mentally ill and up to 
5% were “actively psychotic at any given moment.”51 
A third precursor was the 1970s’ surprisingly swift abandonment of “the central 
justification for imprisonment—the pursuit of the rehabilitative ideal—that had been 
in place for nearly a century.”52 During this period, there was a flurry of criticism of 
rehabilitation as a penal goal. Sociologist Robert Martinson was among the most 
influential critics. He stated that “[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative 
efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”53 
Despite the fact that Martinson later recanted, concluding his own methodology 
had been flawed,54 his initial criticism helped spawn a “nothing works” movement 
that “within a few short years, [convinced] many penologists and prison 
administrators across the country . . . [of] the stunning conclusion that any attempt 
to facilitate positive change inside prison was fundamentally flawed and doomed to 
fail.”55 Many politicians, scholars, and judges also joined this bandwagon.56 They 
supported abandoning rehabilitation not only because of the high rates of recidivism 
but also because of concerns that rehabilitation could lead to large discrepancies 
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among sentences or to indeterminate sentencing.57 There was also the philosophical 
challenge of whether it was a defensible position to “lock[] people up until they 
become better people.”58 
When rehabilitation was swept aside, the predominant penal theories that filled the 
void were incapacitation and retribution59—the latter renamed “just deserts” for easier 
public consumption.60 “Prisons were no longer designed to cure; they were intended to 
be aversive and unpleasant.”61 It was far easier to justify harsh conditions of solitary 
confinement if the predominant penal goal was punishment and incapacitation rather 
than rehabilitation. Also, the lack of rehabilitation programs created a void of 
meaningful and productive activities for the inmates and contributed to the final and 
most important precursor to the resurgence of solitary confinement. 
That final precursor was violence. Overcrowding, combined with an extreme 
influx of mentally ill inmates (who often have trouble regimenting their behavior 
within the strict rules of a prison environment due to their illness) and an extreme 
decrease in any rehabilitative programs (creating large-scale and unprecedented 
idleness), provided for a dangerous dynamic in prisons.62 Solitary confinement was 
the prison officials’ answer to an increasingly difficult-to-control, violent, and 
gang-dominated prison population.63 
Dr. Terry Kupers, a prominent expert on the effects of solitary confinement, 
explained that 
[i]nstead of arriving at the obvious correct conclusion . . . that the 
crowding and idleness caused serious damage and needed to be reversed 
. . . and educational and training programs needed to be reinstituted and 
strengthened, corrections authorities instead opted to place the blame for 
the uncontrollable violence on a new breed of prisoners, 
“super-predators,” and proceeded to place a growing proportion of those 
they vilified as “the worst of the worst” in round-the-clock solitary 
confinement.64 
The origin of the modern U.S. supermax facility—where “conditions typically 
include solitary confinement twenty-three hours each day in a barren 
environment”65—can be traced to particular events in October 1983. The location was 
the U.S. penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, a maximum-security prison that had replaced 
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the controversial prison at Alcatraz.66 Violence had been steadily rising at the prison 
in recent years and culminated in the murders of two prison guards in separate events 
on a single day.67 Four days later, an inmate was also found murdered.68 Shortly 
thereafter, the warden declared a state of emergency and put the entire prison on a 
twenty-three hour-a-day lockdown status. The lockdown was not lifted—and thus a 
maximum-security prison was transformed into the first “supermax.”69 
Prolonged solitary confinement became known as the “Marion Model,” and both 
the federal government and many states built their own supermax facilities in the 
years that followed.70 By 2004, a study reported that forty-four states had supermaxes 
housing approximately 25,000 inmates71 (a sizable percentage of the 80,000-plus 
inmates in solitary confinement throughout the United States).72 “Few, if any, 
rehabilitation or education programs exist in supermaxes.”73 
Although conditions and definitions vary among supermax facilities, over 95% of 
state prison wardens agreed with the following definition: “A supermax is a 
stand-alone unit or part of another facility and is designated for violent or disruptive 
inmates. It typically involves up to 23-hour-per-day, single-cell confinement for an 
indefinite period of time. Inmates in supermax housing have minimal contact with 
staff and other inmates.”74 
Again, over 95% of state wardens agreed that the primary goals of supermax 
prisons include “increasing safety, order, and control throughout prison systems and 
incapacitating violent or disruptive inmates.”75 There was much less consensus on 
other potential goals.76 
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Supermax prisons can be two-to-three times more expensive to build and operate 
than traditional maximum-security prisons.77 Each one represents “close to [a] $1 
billion investment over 30 to 40 years, the typical life span of a prison.”78 A 2009 
Pew study examining state and federal data found that criminal correction spending 
outpaced budget growth in all areas but Medicaid, which had quadrupled over the 
past two decades.79 
While isolation units (whether in supermaxes or elsewhere) are often advertised 
as housing only the “worst of the worst,” the reality is quite different.80 Prisoners in 
solitary confinement are generally housed there for one of three purposes: (1) to 
protect them from threats they would be subject to in the general population (children 
in adult prisons are among those who may fall in this category81); (2) to punish 
noncompliance with prison rules; or (3) to control individuals perceived as a current 
or future threat.82 In most isolation units, those with serious records of violence in 
the prison itself “are the exception rather than the rule.”83 Many are housed there for 
an unacceptable number of minor rule violations or for suspected gang membership. 
The allegation of gang membership may result in indefinite solitary confinement—
even when “the prisoners in question may not have engaged in any overt rule 
violations other than their alleged connection to the gang, and may remain entirely 
free of disciplinary write-ups during the many years of their indefinite isolation.”84 
A highly disproportionate number of those in solitary confinement are severely 
mentally ill. Many of the symptoms of severe mental illness can make it difficult to 
conform to the highly regimented rules and procedures of the prison environment. 
Thus, prison officials “often ‘treat disordered behavior as disorderly behavior.’”85 
This may happen even with minor infractions, for many of the state and federal 
policies regarding who may be placed in solitary are extremely vague and open 
ended—for example, one state’s policies allowed solitary confinement if the inmate 
was unpredictable or “difficult to manage in other prison settings.”86 One former 
prisoner “recalled being put in solitary confinement for petty annoyances like 
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refusing to get out of the shower quickly enough.”87 Thus, imposition of solitary 
confinement is ultimately at the discretion of prison administrators and may last for 
days, weeks, months, years, or decades—and is often simply indefinite. 
While it is difficult to provide a precise definition of modern solitary confinement 
in the United States because of the varying conditions across the nation, there are 
some general trends. Inmates are generally confined alone in cells that range in 
dimension from sixty to eighty square feet for approximately twenty-three hours a 
day.88 The cells generally contain a bunk, a toilet, and a sink, and ventilation is often 
substandard.89 Exercise is usually limited to one hour a day alone in often small, 
barren exercise rooms. Prisoners “are kept under constant surveillance with 
‘computerized locking and tracking systems [used to] allow their movement to be 
regulated with a minimum of human interaction.’”90 Contact visits are generally 
prohibited as are all work, rehabilitation, or other activities and programs.91 If 
mental-health treatment is provided, it may be through the small portal at their cell 
front.92 “The norm is to impose, to the fullest extent possible, complete sensory 
deprivation and social isolation.”93 
II. EFFECTS OF ISOLATION AND SENSORY DEPRIVATION ON THE 
BRAIN, BODY, AND BEHAVIOR 
It’s an awful thing, solitary . . . . It crushes your spirit and weakens your resistance more 
effectively than any other form of mistreatment. 
– Senator John McCain, who spent more than two years in isolation in a fifteen-by-fifteen 
cell during his five and a half years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam94 
Senator John McCain’s assertion that solitary is the worst form of mistreatment 
came “from a man who was beaten regularly; denied adequate medical treatment for 
two broken arms, a broken leg, and chronic dysentery; and tortured to the point of 
having an arm broken again.”95 A study of one group of former Vietnam War 
prisoners also “reported that they found social isolation to be as torturous and 
agonizing as any physical abuse they suffered”—and many had suffered worse 
physical abuse than Senator McCain.96 
Terry Anderson, an Associated Press reporter who was held hostage for seven 
years by Hezbollah in Lebanon, explained that when he was housed with other 
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hostages his ability to concentrate, to read, to avoid hallucinations, and to control his 
emotions all improved. But when he was imprisoned for indefinite periods alone, he 
could feel his mind disintegrating: his sleep patterns changed; he became neurotically 
possessive and emotionally unstable; and his abilities to concentrate, remember, and 
process information were all severely limited. He would sometimes physically 
tremble without cause and begin to fear that he would lose his mind and all control. 
After three years of captivity he did lose control and began beating his head against 
a wall—his head was smashed and bleeding by the time guards stopped his sudden 
self-violence.97 
Another hostage who had been a private-school director was placed in solitary 
confinement for four months before being housed with Anderson. The director had 
become severely withdrawn—lying for hours facing a wall in a semicatatonic state. 
He seemed unable to follow even simple instructions from the guards, which resulted 
in the guards often becoming abusive with him. Upon his release after three and a 
half years, he had to be placed in a psychiatric hospital.98 
These examples illustrate what studies show—that solitary confinement is dangerous 
to the mental health of all individuals, whether they previously experienced 
mental-health issues or not (though previous vulnerabilities increase the risk).99 “[W]hen 
inmates are subjected to extensive cell confinement and deprivation of activities and 
stimulation, a majority can be expected to report moderate to serious psychological 
symptoms.”100 Add isolation to the mix, and the prevalence rates grow even higher.101 
Why would simply leaving someone alone in a confined space for a prolonged 
period equate to a form of torture for these prisoners? 
The answer at least partially lies in the nature of the human brain. When compared 
to the brains of other animals, humans have a much larger brain relative to body size. 
The best predictor of brain size in the animal kingdom is the size of a species’ social 
group. In other words, “[w]e have big brains in order to socialize.”102 
Neuroscientists have discovered that when the brain is not involved in an active 
task, it automatically falls into a neural configuration named the “default network,” 
which is almost identical to the brain configuration used for social thinking. One 
neuroscientist explained that the primary purpose of the brain seems to be social 
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thinking: “Evolution has made a bet . . . that the best thing for our brain to do in any 
spare moment is to get ready for what comes next in social terms.”103 
Neuropsychologists have also called the brain an “infovore,” as it constantly 
craves new information through the senses. The natural world to which the brain is 
accustomed is one of rich sensory stimulation. One theory is that it is human nature 
to love learning because novel, interpretable stimuli cause significant neural activity 
in the temporal lobe, producing greater quantities of endorphins.104 
Thus, social thinking and sensory interpretation are fundamental brain activities 
on which a healthy brain thrives. But what exactly happens to brain, body, and 
behavior when a person is deprived of opportunities to have meaningful social 
connections or a sensory-rich environment? Scientists are currently seeking answers 
to those questions. For example, recent studies have noted that perceived social 
isolation (loneliness) is associated with decreased activity in regions of the brain 
associated with empathy, learning, and rewards;105 is linked to an increased risk of 
dementia in later life;106 may impact sleep patterns;107 and is associated with lower 
rates of physical and mental health.108 It has also long been established that if all 
sight, sound, and tactile sensations are eliminated, people may enter a hallucinatory 
state in as little as forty-eight hours.109 
Social isolation is as strong a risk factor for morbidity and mortality as are 
smoking, obesity, a sedentary lifestyle, and high blood pressure. When this was first 
discovered, it spawned the “social control hypothesis”—the assumption that the link 
between isolation and adverse health effects was due to external pressures from the 
social network to have better health behaviors. However, more recent studies have 
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caused scientists to reject this theory as insufficient to explain the wide variety of 
harms that occur in an isolation environment.110 
This Part examines the evidence regarding social isolation and sensory 
deprivation’s effects by surveying modern prisoner studies and studies of such 
deprivations in other contexts. 
A. Modern Prisoner Studies 
There are inherent difficulties with performing studies on prisoner populations, 
especially those housed in solitary confinement. Most obviously, there is the problem 
of access. But even if that hurdle is surmounted, if one is studying the effects of 
isolation on brain, body, and behavior, then the very contact with the prisoner is 
changing the condition (isolation) whose effect one is trying to measure. This 
phenomenon of modified behavior due to being the subject of a study is commonly 
known as the “Hawthorne Effect.” Researchers in one prisoner isolation study renamed 
it the “Alysha Effect” after the attractive young woman who interviewed the 
prisoners—two of whom were dropped from the study because of sexual advances.111 
Other problems can include how to make certain your population is representative 
when the sample size is often necessarily small (due to access issues) and how to 
provide for a control group. Some experts believe the vulnerability and lack of 
freedom of prisoners makes them incapable of giving truly informed consent. Thus, 
studies of prisoners are often subject to heightened scrutiny from institutional review 
boards. The vulnerable position of prisoners may also make them hesitant to share 
any information that might be used against them in critical decisions, such as parole 
or whether solitary confinement should be prolonged.112 
However, even with these challenges, the bulk of the modern research on 
prisoners in solitary confinement is remarkably consistent in its findings of 
deleterious psychological effects.113 This subpart presents insights drawn from 
various studies. 
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In the United States, nearly half of prison suicides occur in solitary confinement, 
even though estimates of the percentage of those in solitary confinement range 
between 2–8%.114 
“Strikingly consistent” psychiatric symptoms among inmates in isolation include 
hyperresponsitivity to external stimuli; perceptual distortions, illusions, and 
hallucinations; severe panic attacks; difficulty with thinking, concentration, and 
memory; intrusive obsessional (and often violent) thoughts that prisoners resist but 
cannot block out; overt paranoia; and problems with impulse control.115 One study 
of prisoners in Pelican Bay’s isolation units found 91% suffering from heightened 
anxiety, 86% having hyperresponsitivity to external stimuli, 84% having difficulty 
with concentration and memory, 84% having confused thought processes, 71% 
                                                                                                                 
 
contact such as suicidal and self-destructive behavior and emergence of psychotic symptoms. 
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Deprivation of Liberty, 11 CAN. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N J. 470 (1966) (finding three consistent 
patterns of behavior among isolated inmates: verbal aggression, physical destruction of 
surroundings, and development of an inner fantasy world including paranoid psychosis—also 
general uncontrolled rage and an increase in homicidal and suicidal impulses). 
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experiencing wide mood and emotional swings, 61% having aggressive fantasies, 
44% suffering visual distortions, and 41% experiencing hallucinations. More than 
half (56%) of prisoners experienced at least five of these symptoms, and 34% 
experienced all eight.116 
Participants in another study of solitary confinement developed psychopathologies 
at a rate of 28%, versus 15% in the general population.117 A study of Danish prisoners 
found that prisoners who remained in solitary confinement for longer than four weeks 
had a “probability of being admitted to the prison hospital for a psychiatric reason 
[that] was about 20 times as high as for a person” in the general population.118 
A week of voluntary solitary confinement by prisoners resulted in decreased 
electroencephalogram (EEG) activity, which is indicative of increased theta activity, 
which, in turn, is related to stress, tension, and anxiety.119 “Indeed, even a few days 
of solitary confinement will predictably shift the [EEG] pattern toward an abnormal 
pattern characteristic of stupor and delirium.”120 
Prisoners in solitary confinement engage in higher rates of self-mutilation than 
those in the general population.121 
For some prisoners, prolonged isolation interferes with social identity causing them to 
experience a profound “ontological insecurity,” or doubts about their own existence.122 
While some of the acute symptoms tend to subside after release from isolation, 
there are long-term effects that may persist for decades. 
These not only include persistent symptoms of post traumatic stress 
(such as flashbacks, chronic hypervigilance, and a pervasive sense of 
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Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 77 (emphases added) (written statement of 
Craig Haney, Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz). 
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hopelessness), but also lasting personality changes—especially 
including a continuing pattern of intolerance of social interaction, 
leaving the individual socially impoverished and withdrawn, subtly 
angry and fearful when forced into social interaction.123 
B. Brain and Behavior Studies Outside the Modern Prison 
Isolation and sensory deprivation are serious issues for several groups outside the 
modern domestic-prison context—including pilots, astronauts, Arctic and Antarctic 
explorers, prisoners of war, and shipwrecked sailors. These groups have reported 
“deterioration in the ability to think and reason, perceptual distortions, gross 
disturbances in feeling states, and vivid imagery in the form of hallucinations and 
delusions.”124 Studies of other social animals placed in isolation or 
sensory-deprivation environments also support the thesis that these conditions 
themselves are a cause of severe psychological and physical harm. Examples are 
explored in more detail below. 
1. Extreme Exploration 
A recent report for NASA on sensory deprivation concluded that “[t]he prolonged 
stress consequences of [sensory deprivation] lead to detrimental neurological changes 
in the human brain, which can manifest in maladaptive behavior disorders.”125 And 
“increased duration increases the intensity and likelihood” of such behaviors.126 
The report explains that substituting an unchanging monotonous environment 
(such as a spacecraft or a prison cell) for Earth’s natural environment deprives the 
sensory organs of normal levels of stimulation. The brain interprets the sensory 
deprivation as stress, and one of the body’s responses is to elevate cortisol levels. If 
sensory deprivation is prolonged, chronic stress may occur.127 “Under chronic stress, 
spatial and verbal memory and cognitive processes suffer. Excessive levels of 
cortisol interfere with memory formation and retrieval . . . . Behavioral effects 
include an increase in anxiety, paranoia, withdrawal and territorial behavior.”128 
Sensory deprivation also “reduces brain activity and weakens neuromodulatory 
control. This results in negative brain plasticity processes, which create a self-
reinforcing downward spiral of degraded brain function.”129 
Prolonged stress exposure of this type may place a person “at a significant risk 
for future psychiatric deterioration, possibly including the development of 
irreversible psychiatric symptoms.”130 The NASA report cites examples of prisoners 
of war who, even forty years after release, may continue to suffer “symptoms of 
anxiety, confusion, depression, suspiciousness and detachment from social 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Grassian, supra note 13, at 353. 
 124. NASA REPORT, supra note 104, at 8. 
 125. Id. at 6. 
 126. Id. at 11. 
 127. See id. at 35. 
 128. Id. at 38. 
 129. Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130. Id. at 41. 
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interactions.”131 People who have been in prolonged isolation and confined 
environments often suffer from symptoms that resemble posttraumatic stress 
disorder—including “anxiety, nervousness, frequent nightmares, depression, 
difficulty sleeping, inability to work, and difficulty trusting people, as well as 
difficulties adapting to the world outside of confinement.”132 
A study of British Royal Air Force pilots who had experienced restricted auditory 
and visual stimulation in flight found that all had become significantly anxious, 
“many suffered full-blown panic attacks,” and some described “feelings of 
detachment from reality, and perceptual distortions.”133 A similar study of U.S. Navy 
pilots found that “over one third experienced frightening feelings of unreality and 
became severely anxious” when flying alone at high altitude where there is a lack of 
visual and sensory stimulation.134 
A study of astronauts revealed that “[m]onotonous surroundings were found to 
lead to boredom, fatigue and reduction in job interest, physical anesthetization, as 
well as the emergence of psychic disorders and altered behavior.”135 In response to 
such concerns, the former Soviet Union was among those that placed astronauts in 
“psychological relief rooms” for ten-minute sessions where they were surrounded by 
natural sounds and music, film, and odors that mimicked the effect of being 
immersed in nature and provided “relief for visual fatigue and nervous emotional 
loads.”136 Ground-based studies found that use of these rooms increased work 
production by 1.5 times, and errors were reduced by 25%.137 
Individual reactions to isolation and sensory deprivation can vary widely. A recent 
experiment conducted by the Russian Academy of Science in conjunction with the 
European and Chinese space agencies placed a six-man crew in a simulated space ship 
for 520 days. Even with participants who were heavily screened for strong physical 
and mental strength and stamina, there were significant issues. One of the scientists 
involved explained that “[o]ur major finding was that there were really large individual 
differences with how the crew responded to the [small group] isolation . . . . Four of 
them showed at least one issue that could have exploded or led to a severe adverse 
effect during a Mars mission.”138 Reactions included trouble sleeping, lethargy, 
problems with mental tasks, mood swings, and depression. 
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For explorers and workers in the Arctic and Antarctic, the extremely harsh 
conditions can cause small groups to be isolated and confined over long periods. 
Winters last up to nine months, with temperatures so cold that venturing outside is 
dangerous. Because of the prevalence of psychological disturbances during these 
months, rigorous psychological screening is given beforehand. But significant levels 
of psychiatric disturbances continue despite these preventive efforts. Common issues 
include interpersonal tension and hostility, progressively worsening depression, sleep 
disturbance, impaired cognitive functioning, and paranoia.139 
Thus, isolation and sensory deprivation can have serious consequences in a variety 
of settings, and detrimental psychiatric consequences may persist even when small 
groups are confined together. It is also very difficult to determine in advance who will 
fare best under such conditions—even those that seem strongest (screened astronauts 
and Arctic explorers, for instance) may suffer severe psychiatric deterioration. 
2. Effects of Isolation on Other Social Animals 
“Animal studies of social isolation are an important complement to human studies 
because randomization and experimental manipulations of isolation in humans is 
limited in intensity and duration due to the risk of deleterious effects.”140 Many 
studies of other social animals confirm the negative harmful effects of social isolation 
across species. 
Some of the most dramatic studies on the isolation of animals have been 
conducted with rhesus monkeys. Monkeys raised in isolation were “profoundly 
disturbed, given to staring blankly and rocking in place for long periods, circling 
their cages repetitively, and mutilating themselves.”141 If released into a group, they 
seemed to enter a state of emotional shock and would engage in self-clutching and 
rocking. One refused to eat and died within five days. Some of those that had been 
isolated for shorter periods were eventually able to adjust, but “[t]welve months of 
isolation almost obliterated the animals socially.”142 Such animals were permanently 
withdrawn and often abused by the larger group.143 More recent studies on other 
animal groups have confirmed that the workings of the brain seem to be particularly 
vulnerable to permanent alteration if animals are socially isolated in early life.144 
This insight extends to humans. Juveniles are currently often placed in isolation 
in adult jails for their own protection. But the destructive nature of isolation on a 
young brain is evidenced in the suicide rates. In juvenile facilities, over 50% of 
suicides occur in solitary confinement. In adult jails, the statistics are much higher. 
“Suicides of youth in isolation occur nineteen times more often than in the general 
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population; youth suicide rates are thirty-six times higher in adult jails than in 
juvenile detention facilities.”145 
Other studies have shown multiple physically and psychologically damaging 
effects from isolation of animals more generally. For example, chronic social 
isolation of Wistar rats caused anxiety-like and depression-like behavior that 
paralleled molecular changes in the limbic brain.146 Social isolation (1) decreased the 
lifespan of fruit flies because of oxidative stress, (2) decreased survival after 
experimentally induced strokes in mice, (3) increased obesity and type-two diabetes 
in mice, (4) increased the growth of cancerous tumors in rats, (5) increased 
stress-hormone levels and oxidative stress in rabbits, and (6) caused an elevated 
morning rise in cortisol in squirrel monkeys.147 
Commenting on the relationship between such animal studies and the human 
experience, John Cacioppo, the director of the University of Chicago’s Center for 
Cognitive and Social Neuroscience, explained: 
The effects of isolation in humans have much in common with the effects 
of isolation found in nonhuman social species. Researchers found 
increased activation of the brain’s stress systems, vascular resistance, and 
blood pressure, as well as decreased inflammatory control, immunity, 
sleep salubrity, and expression of genes regulating glucocorticoid 
responses and oxidative stress. In sum, the health, life, and genetic legacy 
of members of most social species are threatened when they find 
themselves on the social perimeter.148 
One of Cacioppo’s most influential insights is that these types of effects are more 
strongly linked to perceived isolation than actual isolation. One of his explanations for 
the great diversity we see in people’s responses to isolation is that different people have 
different levels of tolerance for social disconnection—some feel the pain of such 
disconnection more intensely than others. He argues that people such as Arctic explorers 
are self-selected to be those who have higher thresholds for social disconnection.149 
Cacioppo also claims one’s susceptibility to loneliness is approximately 50% 
hereditable. He bases the hereditable theory partially on an experiment that was 
conducted with rat pups—selectively bred for twenty-five generations dependent on 
the strength of their maternal cry. The descendants of those with the strongest cry 
(who seemed to feel the pain of deprivation from their mothers most greatly) had 
greater cortisol, more depressive behavior, more withdrawal, and more anxiety than 
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the descendants of the softer-crying pups. All these attributes and behaviors are 
mimicked in people who have high levels of perceived isolation.150 
Thus the evidence regarding reactions to isolation and sensory deprivation among 
the general populace, prisoners, extreme explorers, and animals all points in one 
direction: it is clear these deprivations can cause severe harms. The lesson of the 
emerging field of social neuroscience is that the behavioral deteriorations witnessed 
are linked to physical alterations occurring in the brain and body that are in turn 
caused by the social and sensory deprivations. These physical alterations have 
implications beyond the immediately visible behaviors—and can lead to a wide 
variety of types of physical and mental disability and disease. 
It is difficult (if not presently impossible) to determine precisely which harms will 
befall which people with what level of severity and how soon. Severely debilitating 
harms befall significant portions of the population even among those that have been 
heavily screened for resilience. While not every person may feel the pain of social 
disconnection and sensory deprivation to the same degree, all are at risk of serious 
health consequences when so deprived. As explained previously, recent discoveries 
have clarified that human brains are uniquely designed for social interaction. The 
many examples of deterioration examined above illustrate that social interaction and 
sensory stimulation are human necessities for health and well-being. 
With this understanding of the threatened harms, the Article turns to how to 
analyze such risks of harm under an Eighth Amendment framework. 
III. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF PRISON CONDITIONS 
Public apathy and the political powerlessness of inmates have contributed to the 
pervasive neglect of the prisons. . . . Under these circumstances, the courts have emerged as 
a critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane conditions. 
– Justice Brennan 151 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
Although the Supreme Court has never considered a case in which a party argued 
that solitary confinement as generally practiced in the United States is per se cruel 
and unusual, the Court has acknowledged that “[c]onfinement in . . . an isolation cell 
is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”152 
This baseline assumption was not always clear. Until 1976, the Court had not 
considered whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishments” was applicable to prison conditions. Some had argued, as Justice Thomas 
does today, that “judges or juries—but not jailers—impose ‘punishment.’”153 But 
others argued that at least some (if not all) conditions of imprisonment could represent 
“punishment” within the meaning of the Amendment. 
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764 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:741 
 
Estelle v. Gamble154 was the first case in which the Supreme Court applied the 
Punishments Clause to a condition of confinement. (Some do not characterize Estelle 
as a prison-condition case—but I use the term broadly, as has the Supreme Court.)155 
Estelle held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment.”156 
That case explained the history of the Punishments Clause in broad strokes (and, 
as will be discussed in the next Part of this Article, in strokes not all scholars would 
agree are correct). According to Estelle, the drafters’ primary concern was “to 
proscribe tortures and other barbarous methods of punishment.”157 And the first 
Supreme Court cases addressing this constitutional provision confined themselves to 
such concerns. But in later cases, the Punishments Clause was interpreted to have a 
broader scope. While Estelle recognized that in worst-case scenarios failure to 
provide medical treatment might result in “‘torture or a lingering death,’ the evils of 
most immediate concern to the drafters of the Amendment,”158 it was under this 
broader interpretation of the Punishments Clause that the Court found a government 
obligation to provide medical care for those it incarcerated.159 
Landmark cases that had provided a broadened definition of Eighth Amendment 
protection include Weems v. United States160—an early twentieth-century case that 
rejected the idea that “cruel and unusual punishments” could refer only to 
punishments on par with disembowelment, burning alive, physical torture, or 
methods causing a lingering death.161 Instead, Weems examined the Punishments 
Clause in the context of the rest of the Amendment, which prohibits excessive bail 
or fines, and found that the Amendment proscribes “all punishments which by their 
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. . . . 
The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive in the bail required or fine 
imposed, or punishment inflicted.”162 Thus, the Court overturned a sentence that 
included fifteen years of “hard and painful labor” in chains at the ankle and wrist 
night and day for the offense of falsifying a public document.163 The case also 
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observed that the Punishments Clause was not static but progressive and could 
“acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”164 
In 1958, Trop v. Dulles most famously picked up this latter theme, declaring in a 
plurality opinion that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”165 In a 
footnote, the case seemed to dismiss the idea that the language “cruel and unusual” 
should be translated in its most literal sense—though a close reading shows the Court 
taking no particular stand on that issue. The Court explained: 
Whether the word “unusual” has any qualitative meaning different from 
“cruel” is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had to consider 
the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and 
unusualness do not seem to have been drawn. [Our] cases indicate that 
the Court simply examines the particular punishment involved in light of 
the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any 
subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word “unusual.”166 
The footnote went on to explain that if “unusual” had any separate meaning from 
“cruel” (an issue on which the Court took no position), it should simply be “the ordinary 
one, signifying something different from that which is generally done.”167 And the 
Court explained that denationalization, the punishment at issue in the case, would meet 
such a test since it was first explicitly sanctioned by the government only in 1940 and 
had never been “tested against the Constitution until this day,”168 even though “this 
day” was eighteen years later—meaning it had been in use for nearly two decades. 
But in the main body of the opinion, the Court did not spend space or energy in 
defining “cruel and unusual” in such literal terms. Instead the Court asserted that 
“[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the 
dignity of man.”169 While the State had the “power to punish, the Amendment stands 
to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”170 And 
the Court found that denationalization violated those civilized standards by “the total 
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.”171 Interestingly, the 
opinion also refers to the “virtual unanimity” of “civilized nations of the world” for 
moral authority that statelessness should not be an available criminal punishment.172 
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Such international comparisons and the position that what is “cruel and unusual” 
should be defined by contemporary evolving standards could be interpreted as an effort 
to determine what is and is not sufficiently “unusual” under the Amendment, but the 
Trop footnote discussed above suggests that is not how the Court envisioned it. Instead, 
the international comparisons and efforts to determine contemporary standards seem 
to simply provide further authority for making the normative moral judgment of what 
should be considered excessively cruel or inhumane.173 
Another case upon which Estelle drew extensively was one that had been decided 
earlier that same year, Gregg v. Georgia.174 As recognized in Estelle, Gregg 
explained that under the oft-quoted Trop decision, punishments indeed needed to 
comport with public perceptions of standards of decency.175 But beyond that, 
punishments must accord with “the dignity of man,” which meant “at least” that 
excessive punishments were prohibited.176 Excessive punishments in the abstract (as 
opposed to challenges of specific punishments for a specific defendant for specific 
crimes) were defined as ones that either involved the “unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain” or were “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”177 
Expounding on “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” the Court explained that 
a “sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it 
results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.”178 
In Estelle, withholding medications for a serious injury was found to be just such 
an unnecessary infliction of pain without penal justification. By finding that the 
Eighth Amendment “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized 
standards, humanity, and decency,’” the Court established the government’s 
obligation to care for prisoners who could not care for themselves due to their 
incarceration.179 The Court stated that 
[t]he infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with 
contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation 
codifying the common-law view that “it is but just that the public be 
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation 
of his liberty, care for himself.”180 
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But, in a move that has been heavily criticized by some scholars,181 the Court did 
not go so far as to say that any failure or even any negligent failure to provide 
adequate medical care for serious illness or injury would qualify as a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. The key words were “deliberate indifference.” Negligence 
might result in the unnecessary infliction of pain—but only when there was 
deliberate indifference would it also be “wanton” or sufficiently “repugnant to the 
conscience of mankind” to “offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.”182 
Several cases following Estelle indicated that the Supreme Court would be willing 
to consider prison conditions generally (beyond issues of medical attention) under 
the Eighth Amendment. For example, Ingraham v. Wright stated in dicta that 
“[p]rison brutality . . . is ‘part of the total punishment to which the individual is being 
subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny.’”183 Hutto v. Finney was the first case to actually require an analysis of the 
Eighth Amendment’s relation to prison conditions beyond medical care. The parties 
did not dispute that the Punishments Clause applied to prison conditions generally—
and the Court observed that “[c]onfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a 
form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”184 
Prison officials challenged only two aspects of relief granted by the district court. In 
upholding the district court’s remedy regarding limitations on solitary confinement, 
the Supreme Court considered only objective conditions of confinement and stated 
there was “no error in the [district court’s] conclusion that, taken as a whole, 
conditions in the isolation cells continued to violate the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.”185 
Rhodes v. Chapman was the first case in which the disputed issue before the Court 
was the limitations that the Eighth Amendment imposes on conditions of 
confinement in prison beyond medical care. Unsurprisingly, given the language in 
cases like Estelle, Ingraham, and Hutto, the Court held unequivocally that the 
Punishments Clause did apply to prison conditions generally.186 Although Rhodes 
repeated much of Estelle’s language, it refused to recognize any “static ‘test’” that 
could determine an Eighth Amendment violation, since a court would have to 
evaluate “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”187 Most significantly, it did not employ any analysis of whether the 
challenged conditions were the result of “deliberate indifference.” Instead, it made 
an objective analysis of whether the prison conditions resulted in deprivation of “the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” including food, medical care, 
sanitation, and whether violence was increased or other conditions were created that 
would be “intolerable for prison confinement.”188 The Constitution, Rhodes declared, 
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“does not mandate comfortable prisons.”189 But the Court also provided for the 
possibility of a cumulative effect of substandard conditions—explaining that prison 
conditions “alone or in combination” might unconstitutionally deprive a prisoner of 
minimum necessities.190 
Thus, following Rhodes and Estelle, the Court had provided two separate modes 
of analysis—one involving merely an objective inquiry into whether a deprivation 
was sufficiently serious, and the other requiring the additional element of a culpable 
state of mind. Rhodes’s seeming rejection of the idea that deliberate indifference was 
always necessary in an Eighth Amendment prison-conditions case was reiterated in 
a concurrence that emphasized: “The touchstone of the Eighth Amendment inquiry 
is the effect upon the imprisoned.”191 
Recognizing the tension between such divergent modes of analysis, Wilson v. 
Seiter sought to harmonize Estelle and Rhodes. Reasoning that “punishment” must 
inherently be a deliberate act, as opposed to, for example, accidentally stepping on a 
prisoner’s toe, Wilson held that prison conditions could not violate the Eighth 
Amendment without a showing of deliberate indifference and a showing that the 
deprivation was objectively serious enough to constitute a minimal life necessity.192 
Wilson characterized Rhodes as a case in which it had simply not been necessary to 
reach the subjective component of the test for a Punishments Clause violation, 
because the objective prong had not been met.193 
A concurrence of four Justices took issue with this characterization, arguing that 
a subjective test would often be unworkable in the context of conditions created by 
“cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, 
sometimes over a long period of time. . . . In truth, intent simply is not very 
meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution . . . .”194 Further, the 
concurrence argued that the approach was unwise, as it left open the possibility for 
prison officials to defeat challenges of clearly inhumane conditions by showing there 
was some other cause than deliberate indifference—insufficient funding, for 
instance. “The ultimate result of today’s decision, [the concurring Justices feared], is 
that serious deprivations of basic human needs will go unredressed due to an 
unnecessary and meaningless search for deliberate indifference.”195 
Cases that followed further defined the boundaries of the subjective and objective 
tests. Helling v. McKinney provided that a risk of serious injury could be enough to 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.196 “[A] remedy for unsafe conditions need 
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not await a tragic event.”197 The fact that the risked injury may never occur or is not 
imminent is dispositive for neither the objective nor the subjective prongs.198 
Farmer v. Brennan undertook a lengthy analysis of the meaning of “deliberate 
indifference.”199 It concluded that it was “more than mere negligence” and “less than 
acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm 
will result.”200 The Court landed on a standard comparable to what is required in 
criminal rather than civil contexts for recklessness: the prison official must recklessly 
disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety of which he or she was aware, 
not simply one of which the official should have been aware.201 
Although the standard requires actual awareness, that awareness may be inferred 
from circumstantial evidence—such as that the risk was obvious.202 “Nor may a 
prison official escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he 
was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the 
complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who 
eventually committed the assault.”203 Awareness of the general risk would be enough 
to allay the Court’s concerns that the action, or inaction, constituted punishment.204 
The most recent case to address prison conditions and the Eighth Amendment is 
Brown v. Plata. The Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge court ruling requiring 
California to dramatically reduce overcrowding in its prisons to 137.5% of design 
capacity.205 The Court agreed that “[t]he medical and mental health care provided by 
California’s prisons falls below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth 
Amendment. This extensive and ongoing constitutional violation requires a remedy, 
and a remedy will not be achieved without a reduction in overcrowding.”206 It reiterated 
the core of the Eighth Amendment as the “dignity of man”207 and refused to call the 
remedy overbroad, because any prisoners in the system who became sick or mentally 
ill would become the “system’s next potential victims.”208 
Thus, through twists and turns, the modern Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding prison conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment requires both an 
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Id. (emphasis in original). 
 197. Id. at 33. 
 198. See id. 
 199. 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
 200. Id. at 835. 
 201. See id. at 836−38. 
 202. Id. at 842. 
 203. Id. at 843. 
 204. Cf. id. at 838 (“But an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should 
have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be 
condemned as the infliction of punishment.”). 
 205. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). 
 206. Id. at 1947. 
 207. Id. at 1928 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 208. Id. at 1940. 
770 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:741 
 
objective showing of at least a substantial risk of serious harm and a subjective 
showing of recklessness on the part of the government. The objective showing must 
be sensitive to the evolving mores of society. And the subjective component must 
show actual awareness on the part of the government before the condition or risk will 
qualify as “punishment” at all. 
B. Criticisms of Supreme Court Analysis 
The current two-part test for determining whether prison conditions violate the 
Eighth Amendment has received limited scholarly attention when compared to other 
aspects of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, such as sentencing.209 But that is not 
because the test is so well constructed that it is immune from criticism. Indeed, there 
are multiple problems with the current framework. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to include a “deliberate indifference” requirement in 
the Eighth Amendment analysis is fundamentally flawed. First, it places undue 
emphasis on the subjective intent of prison authorities, instead of focusing on the effect 
of conditions upon the imprisoned.210 The text of the Amendment restricts punishments 
based on the nature of those punishments, not the nature of the inflictors. 
Second, the deliberate-indifference standard creates perverse incentives for 
authorities to turn a blind eye to severe human suffering. So long as they do not notice 
an inhumane condition, they will not be held responsible for failing to change it—
even if they reasonably should have noticed it, and “despite the fact that when prison 
officials do not pay attention, prisoners may be exposed to the worst forms of 
suffering and abuse.”211 
Third, by requiring deliberate indifference to classify a prison condition as a 
“punishment,” the standard may cause “courts [to] be too deferential because of the 
difficulty in policing the line between prison conditions that reflect management 
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principles and prison conditions that are punitive in nature.”212 The subjective prong 
can be too easily defeated by showing concerns over cost or other motivations aside 
from deliberate indifference, even if prison conditions are extremely inhumane.213 
Fourth, difficulties in employing the present standard include the problem of how 
to determine institutional intent or an institutional state of mind where there are 
multiple actors with multiple mental states.214 This difficulty will often result in the 
factor simply being a proxy for the fact finder’s biases about the institution.215 
There are also problems with the objective component of the Supreme Court test 
regarding the sufficient severity of the condition at issue—usually meaning whether 
there was a deprivation of a minimal life necessity or an imposition of unnecessary 
suffering so severe that it offends contemporary societal values. 
First—and this criticism applies to Punishments Clause jurisprudence generally, 
not just the prison-conditions test—the dependence on contemporary evolving 
societal values raises numerous difficulties.216 For example, whose values count in 
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that analysis, and how do you measure them? Are international sources relevant? 
Which domestic sources are relevant? What are the time constraints on the analysis—
do we look at what has been accepted over the last ten, twenty, fifty years or more, 
or are we only concerned with current whims? Where there seem to be differences 
in societal viewpoints on a matter, what should tip the balance? Does it make sense 
for the cruel and unusual status of a punishment to turn on how long it takes certain 
elements of our own or others’ societies to recognize the inhumanity in our legislative 
systems (a measure often used by the Supreme Court)? 
On issues particular to a prison-conditions analysis, there are further ambiguities. 
What should qualify as basic life necessities? What about exercise, sunlight, or a 
prisoner who cannot sleep because lights are on all night? How cold must it be before 
lack of heating or adequate blankets become cruel and unusual? Should 
psychological as well as physical harm be considered? Should it matter why any 
particular deprivation occurred?217 
These types of ambiguities contribute to the fear that the “objective prong” of the 
test will again simply be a proxy for preexisting subjective views of what should or 
should not be an acceptable condition of imprisonment. Inconsistent lower court 
judgments on this prong serve to bolster the theory that “[l]ower court decisions on 
what constitutes ‘sufficiently serious’ have been largely dictated by the sentiments 
of the judge and the quality of the advocacy.”218 
Many scholars also see Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as having departed too 
far afield from the requirements of the text. They advocate either a return to an 
analysis of what is cruel219 or an analysis of both what is cruel and what is unusual.220 
However, their interpretations of what those terms should mean in any context, not 
just that of prison conditions, are far from uniform.221 Nor do scholars agree on the 
relation of those two words—that is, whether “unusual” should be considered 
separately at all, and if so, whether it has an entirely independent meaning or equal 
force in a proper interpretation.222 
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The one idea for which there is general consensus is that we should not simply look 
at which specific punishments were considered cruel and unusual at the time of the 
founding.223 Thus, even an ardent originalist like Justice Scalia has said that “in a crunch 
I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other 
federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.” 224 
C. An Improved Prison-Conditions Eighth Amendment Standard 
Because of the multiple problems with the current standard explained above, an 
analysis of prison conditions under the Eighth Amendment should not require a 
finding of deliberate indifference. Such intent is not logically required for an 
inhumane prison condition to qualify as a “punishment.” There was intent in 
imprisoning the inmate—thereby taking on the “carceral burden” of providing for 
that person’s health and safety. Thus all state-created conditions of confinement 
could be interpreted as punishments regardless of whether any particular official 
manifested deliberate indifference regarding particular prison conditions.225 To try to 
disconnect the meaning of punishment from the means by which a sentence is carried 
out would far too easily circumvent constitutional protections.226 
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While all state-created conditions of imprisonment should be thus considered part 
and parcel of a “punishments” definition, this does not mean that every cruel 
condition of imprisonment violates the Eighth Amendment. Prison is an inherently 
cruel environment in that society willfully inflicts pain and suffering. Severely 
restricting liberty of a person for months or years is a cruel act. But it is not 
necessarily excessively cruel, nor is it unusual to, for example, imprison someone 
convicted of an intentional violent crime. 
The words “cruel and unusual” should be interpreted to encompass any prison 
condition that is inhumane or excessively cruel. Scholars have disagreed over the 
original intent regarding whether “cruel and unusual” was to be translated literally 
or whether the words were used as a term of art for excessive punishments of any 
kind regardless of their frequency.227 But interpreting the Punishments Clause as a 
simple popularity test leads to untenable results. Disembowelment, for example, 
should not cease to violate the Eighth Amendment simply because many states or 
countries suddenly revive the practice. 
The Supreme Court’s insight that the Eighth Amendment seems to be directed at 
preventing that which is excessive—in terms of both fines imposed and punishments 
inflicted—is correct. Any punishment that denies a minimum human necessity is 
excessively cruel and inhumane regardless of how frequently it may be employed. 
Minimum human necessities should be defined to include (though not be limited to) 
any condition that imposes an unnecessary and high risk of severe harm—regardless 
of how imminent the risk and regardless of whether the harm ever materializes. 
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“Cruel and unusual” should not be interpreted to mean that the punishment must 
always be literally infrequent before it will violate the Punishments Clause, but 
neither should the word “unusual” be utterly disregarded in its literal sense. Rather, 
the word could be used to clarify the boundaries of what is excessively cruel when 
the boundaries are unclear. If, for example, a defendant has succeeded in showing 
that a prison condition violates a minimum human necessity, then that condition 
should be considered cruel and unusual without further need of analysis. However, 
if the evidence is not overwhelming that the complained-of condition is inhumane or 
excessively cruel, the word “unusual” in its literal sense could provide further data 
points in weighing the decision. Relevant data points in that analysis would include 
both the frequency of the current use of the condition in prisons and whether the use 
has been consistent over time—and if not, whether inconsistencies were due to 
concerns over the condition’s inherent cruelty. 
Courts could use these data points to weigh the ultimate normative question: 
whether the conditions are too cruel to survive an Eighth Amendment analysis. If 
either domestic or international practice has been inconsistent over time due to 
concerns over the cruelty of the treatment, or if the current domestic or international 
trend is away from the practice for similar reasons, those factors should weigh in 
favor of finding the practice cruel and unusual. While international data is relevant, 
domestic evidence should weigh more heavily in the balance to ensure that U.S. law 
is in line with its own societal values. This alternative means of Eighth Amendment 
analysis of prison conditions would be truer to both the text and the purpose of the 
Punishments Clause than the current analytic framework. 
D. Why Solitary Confinement Is “Cruel and Unusual” Despite Its 
Frequent Use in the United States 
While this Article argues for a different standard for measuring what is cruel and 
unusual in terms of prison conditions, solitary confinement should qualify as a 
violation of the Punishments Clause under either the present or a modified 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 
1. Cruel and Unusual Under Today’s Standard 
The analysis under today’s standard would focus on whether solitary-confinement 
conditions meet the two-prong test of (1) sufficiently serious cruelty (2) imposed 
with “deliberate indifference.”228 Although almost all lower courts have refused to 
find solitary confinement cruel and unusual unless aimed at specific vulnerable 
categories such as the severely mentally ill,229 solitary-confinement conditions in the 
United States do satisfy both prongs of the test. 
First, the evidence previously discussed concerning the serious deleterious effects 
of prolonged solitary confinement on the psyche and on the body show that social 
contact and sensory stimulation is a “minimal life necessity”—just like food, 
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sanitation, and medical care (the examples cited in Rhodes230), and “warmth or 
exercise” (examples added by Wilson231). As one expert explained: “Human beings 
require some degree of social interaction and productive activity to establish and 
sustain a sense of identity and to maintain a grasp on reality.”232 
The efforts of some to distinguish psychological harm as somehow less serious 
than physical harm in an Eighth Amendment analysis is flawed on several grounds. 
First, the ongoing social-neuroscience research clarifies that the type of severe 
psychological deterioration observed in solitary confinement is due to physical harms 
imposed on the brain.233 Second, these physical alterations in the brain can lead to 
what society would consider physical harms, such as disease and death.234 Third, the 
disturbed behaviors can also lead to immediately obvious physical harm, including 
self-mutilation and suicide.235 Fourth, if the purpose of cruel and unusual 
punishments is to protect the prisoner from tortuous punishments, most would agree 
that psychological tortures can be far worse than physical ones. Many prefer a broken 
arm to a broken mind. 
The fact that any particular inmate in solitary confinement may not yet be 
exhibiting severe symptoms of psychological deterioration is irrelevant. Helling 
clarified that a risk of serious injury can constitute cruel and unusual punishment.236 
There is no need to wait for an inmate to become insane to acknowledge that solitary 
confinement is cruel and unusual. The fact that serious risks may never materialize 
in serious harm (or that harm may not be imminent) is not dispositive for either prong 
of the test.237 Although it is clear that some populations are at greater risk of harm 
than others (juveniles and the already mentally ill, for instance), no person is immune 
to serious risk—as evidenced by the extremely high percentages of those affected in 
prisons and the studies of psychologically screened astronauts and explorers.238 
The question is “whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of 
to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone 
unwillingly to such a risk.”239 Denial of minimal life necessities has been defined as 
cruel and unusual punishment precisely because such denial meets that standard. 
Civilized society will not tolerate neglecting the most basic human needs of those 
who are necessarily under the state’s care due to the state’s deprivation of their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 230. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347–48 (1981). 
 231. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). 
 232. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 146 (written statement of Shenna 
Bellows, Executive Director, Zachary L. Heiden, Legal Director, and Alysia Melnick, Public 
Policy Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union of Maine) (quoting An Act To Ensure 
Humane Treatment for Special Management Prisoners: Hearing on L.D. 1611 Before the J. 
Comm. on Criminal Justice & Pub. Safety, 124th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2010) [hereinafter 
Maine Hearing] (statement of Dr. Stuart Grassian)). 
 233. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 36 (1993). 
 237. See id. at 33. 
 238. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
 239. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36 (emphasis in original). 
2015] BANNING THE BING 777 
 
liberty.240 The scientific evidence discussed above establishes that some degree of 
social interaction and productive activity is a minimal necessity without which the 
body, brain, and associated behavior may begin to seriously deteriorate. 
The “deliberate indifference” prong of the test is also met. Where injunctive relief 
is sought, prisoners could certainly show by the time of trial that authorities were 
aware of either the actual harm or risk of harm caused by solitary confinement. The 
lawsuit itself would have made them aware even if it had not already been obvious. 
Helling explained that for purposes of injunctive relief, “deliberate indifference[] 
should be determined in light of the prison authorities’ current attitudes and 
conduct.”241 And, according to Farmer, the awareness need not be individualized—
awareness of a general serious risk involved with solitary confinement is enough.242 
Thus, even under the arguably flawed current standard, solitary confinement is 
cruel and unusual—regardless of how usual it may currently be within our system. 
2. Cruel and Unusual Under a Modified Standard 
Under the modified standard proposed, there would be no need to do the 
deliberate-indifference analysis. Because the state has deprived the prisoners of their 
ability to care for themselves through imprisonment, the state has intentionally taken 
on the burden of providing for the prisoners’ basic needs. Thus, any requirement of 
intent inherent in the word “punishment” or “cruelty” is sufficiently met by the intent 
to carry out the sentence and take on the necessary obligations of prisoner care. 
Because, as outlined above, the science has so clearly established that significant 
social contacts and opportunity for productive activity are a basic human necessity, 
there would be no need under the proposed standard to delve any further into the 
“usualness” of the practice. The evidence of what can happen to the body, brain, and 
behavior in conditions of extreme isolation; the high rates of prisoners who do 
severely deteriorate; and the unpredictability of who among the seemingly resilient 
will be among those who suffer severe harm all indicate a high risk of severe harm. 
The risk is unnecessary because no vital prison objective requires the extreme 
conditions employed.243 
However, if a court were to turn to an “unusualness” analysis, it would also find 
support for the decision that the practice violates the Eighth Amendment. First, as 
explained in the history portion of this Article, the United States abandoned 
prolonged or extreme solitary confinement measures in the nineteenth century 
because of concerns over their serious mental health implications for the prisoners 
(as well as cost implications for the institution—though that point would be irrelevant 
to this part of the analysis).244 Thus domestic use of solitary confinement has not 
been consistent over time due to its cruel effects. Second, there is a marked 
international movement against solitary confinement due to similar concerns.245 
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Third, there is even the beginning of a movement against the practice in the United 
States—as evidenced by the stated positions of politicians in the two Senate hearings 
on the issue in 2012 and 2014 and by reforms in places such as Mississippi and 
Maine, which will be discussed in the next Part. 
Thus, under either the current or a modified standard, common forms of solitary 
confinement in the United States are cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES 
Texas’ administrative segregation units are virtual incubators of psychoses-seeding 
illness in otherwise healthy inmates and exacerbating illness in those already 
suffering from mental infirmities. 
– Judge William Justice246 
A. The Policy-Goal Disconnect 
Not only is solitary confinement cruel and unusual because it denies minimum 
life necessities (and is thus illegal regardless of what legitimate policies it might 
promote), but it also fails to significantly advance relevant legitimate policy goals—
including cost savings, institutional safety, public safety, and rehabilitation. 
First, as previously mentioned, solitary confinement is far more expensive than 
available alternatives. For example, in California the annual cost of keeping a 
prisoner in solitary confinement is estimated as $71,000–$78,000, whereas housing 
a prisoner in the general population for the same period costs approximately 
$58,000.247 In Arizona, the numbers are $50,000 compared to $20,000; in Maryland, 
the cost of solitary confinement is three times greater per prisoner; in Ohio, it is twice 
as high; in Texas, 45% greater; in Connecticut, nearly twice as high; and in Illinois, 
it is three times as high.248 The reasons for this increase in cost include not only space 
but also staffing issues, because work done by prisoners in other types of prison 
settings (such as cooking and cleaning) must be done by prison staff.249 The physical 
and psychological toll of the environment would also presumably increase medical 
costs. Note, however, that even if solitary confinement were extremely cost efficient, 
such efficiency could not be a basis for overriding the prohibition on denying 
minimal life necessities. It would be cost efficient to starve all prisoners, but the 
Punishments Clause would not permit it. Cost efficiency is simply one of the multiple 
policy goals that solitary confinement fails to advance. 
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Second, the evidence does not show that solitary confinement reduces institutional 
violence. A study performed in 2003 found solitary-confinement units had no effect on 
prisoner-on-prisoner violence in Arizona, Illinois, and Minnesota; they had no impact 
in Minnesota, they caused an increase in such violence in Arizona, and they only had 
some deterrent effect on prisoner-on-staff violence in Illinois.250 As will be discussed 
further, by June 2012 Mississippi witnessed a 50% decrease in violence after 
eliminating most of its solitary-confinement units, and Maine witnessed no increase in 
violence despite a 70% reduction of such units.251 
Finally, solitary confinement has not proved to be an effective means of 
rehabilitating the prisoner or deterring future crime. As discussed above, rather than 
helping prisoners rehabilitate, solitary confinement may actually cause serious 
physical and psychological deterioration.252 Studies also show that prisoners who 
reenter society directly from solitary confinement have a higher recidivism rate than 
those who spend time in the general population after solitary confinement and before 
release. The differential in a national study was 64% versus 41%.253 Also, in a study of 
Washington inmates released over a one-year period that controlled for criminal history 
and mental health, those that had been released directly from a supermax facility were 
significantly more likely to commit felonies and crimes against individuals.254 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that solitary confinement may make the public less 
safe, because such isolation may “severely impair[] the inmate’s capacity to 
reintegrate into the broader community upon release from imprisonment.”255 As one 
expert noted, “95% of all incarcerated individuals are eventually released, some 
directly out of [solitary confinement] settings. We have succeeded in making those 
individuals as sick, as internally chaotic, as we possibly can.”256 
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B. Successful and Experimental Models 
As these negative effects of solitary confinement have become increasingly 
publicized and litigated, officials in some places have taken note and attempted 
reforms. This subpart will examine three examples: Britain, Maine, and Mississippi. 
1. Great Britain 
Great Britain began its reforms at approximately the same time that the United 
States was beginning its dive into more and more use of solitary confinement. 
Thus, it is a particularly helpful example in terms of looking at the longer-term 
effects of reform. 
In the 1970s, Britain was dealing with a severe violence problem in its prisons and 
was making heavy use of solitary confinement. Because the costs were so high and 
the method did not seem to help decrease violence, authorities opted for reform. The 
philosophical basis for the new approach was “the simple observation that prisoners 
who are unmanageable in one setting often behave perfectly reasonably in another.”257 
Officials decided to focus on violence prevention rather than punishment for past 
violent behavior. “The British noticed that problem prisoners were usually people for 
whom avoiding humiliation and saving face were fundamental and instinctive. When 
conditions maximized humiliation and confrontation, every interaction escalated into 
a trial of strength. Violence became a predictable consequence.”258 
Authorities found that they were able to reduce prison violence by giving 
prisoners increased freedoms, incentives, and opportunities rather than threats of 
harsher punishments and restraints. A New Yorker article explained: 
They reduced isolation and offered them opportunities for work, 
education, and special programming to increase social ties and skills. 
The prisoners were housed in small, stable units of fewer than ten people 
in individual cells, to avoid conditions of social chaos and 
unpredictability. In these reformed “Close Supervision Centres,” 
prisoners could receive mental-health treatment and earn rights for more 
exercise, more phone calls, “contact visits,” and even access to cooking 
facilities. They were allowed to air grievances. And the government set 
up an independent body of inspectors to track the results and enable 
adjustments based on the data.259 
The results have been impressive. The use of long-term isolation in England is 
now negligible. “In all of England, there are now fewer prisoners in ‘extreme 
custody’ than there are in the state of Maine.”260 
The final comment above regarding England (with a population of fifty million) 
having fewer prisoners in solitary confinement than the state of Maine (with a 
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population of 1.2 million) was actually one of the factors that spurred a movement 
for change in Maine.261 
2. Maine 
When initial attempts to pass legislation reforming solitary confinement policies 
in Maine failed, the legislature authorized a study of the issue by representatives from 
both the Maine Department of Health and Human Services and the Maine 
Department of Corrections. The study included the following findings: 
 Prisoners were subjected to solitary confinement for “extraordinary” periods 
of time while officials investigated whether the prisoner was the victim or the 
perpetrator of a particular offense; 
 Prisoners were sometimes kept in solitary confinement simply because the 
prison could not find a bed for them in a general population unit;  
 The prison underutilized alternative sanctions and incentives for controlling 
behavior, which led to overuse of solitary confinement;  
 Prisoners were not provided with assistance in responding to accusations of 
rule-breaking, which was especially difficult for prisoners with mental illness 
or cognitive impairment; 
 A number of individuals with apparent symptoms of serious mental illness 
were housed in the Special Management Unit, despite policies prohibiting 
such housing;  
 The prison had too few mental health staff, and mental health screenings and 
evaluations were inadequately documented; 
 The report noted that reforms might have costs, but that those costs needed to 
be viewed in light of the countervailing costs of recidivism, harm to 
communities, public safety, and “the simple humanity of what we do.” 262 
As a consequence of the study, a newly appointed corrections commissioner 
implemented a series of reforms to limit the use of solitary confinement both in terms 
of the number of prisoners and the length of each stay. Those reforms included the 
following:  
 Solitary confinement in Maine is now reserved for the most serious offenses, 
and most prisoners are punished in their own units (by losing privileges or 
being confined to their own cell within the general population); 
 A prisoner cannot be sent to the Special Management Unit for more than three 
days without the approval of the Commissioner himself; 
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 When a prisoner is sent to the Special Management Unit, his bed remains 
open until he returns;  
 Prisoners in the Special Management Unit have the opportunity to have their 
punishment time cut in half through good behavior; 
 Prisoners in the Special Management Unit have an opportunity to interact 
with other prisoners and with mental health staff in a group setting, and they 
have an opportunity to attend group religious services. Attendance in group 
treatment sessions earns the prisoner additional recreation time, which can be 
used indoors or outdoors; 
 Prisoners are more closely monitored for changes in mental health status; 
 Prisoners in the Special Management Unit have access to televisions, radios 
and reading material, which alleviate some of the oppressive qualities of 
isolation.263 
These changes resulted in a 70% reduction in the use of solitary confinement in 
the Maine State Prison—with no accompanying increase in violence toward 
prisoners or guards.264 
3. Mississippi 
In Mississippi, Unit 32 was a 1000 bed maximum-security facility where all inmates 
were in lockdown in single cells for twenty-three to twenty-four hours per day.265 
Lawsuits were pressuring the state to improve conditions at Unit 32; in the spring and 
summer of 2007, violence culminated with three homicides, one suicide, and many 
disruptive incidents.266 The Commissioner explained that the cultural norm of Unit 32 
had become “disruptive as there were no incentives to change behavior. As one 
offender told me ‘you took all our hope and we have nothing to lose.’”267 
The Commissioner was convinced change was necessary by the deteriorating and 
dangerous environment as well as by the “increased litigation.”268 Partnering with 
experts from the National Institute of Corrections and the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the Department of Corrections developed a classification model using 
objective criteria for placement in administrative segregation and requiring an 
individualized plan so that every prisoner understood what steps he must take to be 
released from solitary and how to increase his privileges. Counseling and education 
programs were implemented, including group counseling sessions for those in 
solitary (with some innovative methods of restraint to ensure safety). Special steps 
were taken to better care for the needs of mentally ill inmates, including employing 
specially trained correctional officers for those units housing them.269 Group 
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recreational and congregate dining opportunities were also provided to those that had 
been in twenty-three to twenty-four hour isolation.270 
Due to these types of reforms, Mississippi was able to close Unit 32 in 2010, 
resulting in annual savings of approximately $5.6 million.271 Those housed in solitary 
confinement dropped by 75.6% between 2007 and 2012.272 As of June 2012, 
Mississippi housed 316 prisoners in solitary confinement units—down from 1300 in 
2007. Those 316 constituted 1.4% of the Mississippi prison population.273 This 
reduction not only did not cause more violence—there was a 50% drop in violent 
incidents that the Commissioner credits to “[t]he administrative segregation reduction 
along with the implementation of faith-based and other programs.”274 He also credited 
the state’s 27% recidivism rate over a three-year period (one of the lowest in the 
country) to the programs implemented in the wake of these reforms, including “Adult 
Basic Education, vocational school, alcohol and drug programs, fatherhood education, 
and pre-release programs, as well as [the state’s] reentry programs.”275 
In oral testimony before a Senate committee, Commissioner Epps explained that there 
were three keys to his reforms. First, there must be a genuine, documented classification 
system. Second, there must be rehabilitative programs in place. Third, leadership must 
have the correct vision of who belongs in solitary confinement—in Mississippi, he said, 
any prisoner’s placement in solitary has to be approved by himself and a deputy 
director.276 Having strict guidelines for placing people in solitary confinement, he 
explained, can help distinguish between “who you are afraid of” versus “who you are 
mad at.”277 Only the former, he implied, should spend any time in isolation units. 
CONCLUSION: PROPOSED CHANGES AND REAWAKENING TO REHABILITATION 
If you treat people like animals, that’s exactly the way they’ll behave. 
– Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Mississippi278 
From the above examples it is clear that there are many avenues a state could take to 
improve conditions and outcomes in this nation’s prisons. States should be free to 
experiment with a wide variety of approaches, but “‘[t]here are limits to the extent to 
which a [state] may conduct . . . experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality’ 
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of the individual.”279 What are those limits? What are the minimum reforms necessary to 
avoid cruel and unusual punishment in the context of solitary confinement? 
For a system of solitary confinement to survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny, it 
cannot deny a minimum human necessity—and creating environments that present a 
high risk of severe and unnecessary harm denies a minimum human necessity. It may 
be necessary, in the interest of institutional safety, to place a prisoner alone in a cell 
temporarily—but being housed alone should not entail denial of access to meaningful 
social relationships, nor should it deny access to all rehabilitative programs, nor 
should it require excessive sensory deprivation. 
Experts who have studied prisoners in solitary confinement have explained that 
“[h]uman beings require some degree of social interaction and productive activity to 
establish and sustain a sense of identity and to maintain a grasp on reality.”280 Moreover, 
isolation does not need to be complete in order to be dangerously 
debilitating; it is the absence of “meaningful” social interaction that 
destroys a person’s ability to cope. The occasional sight of a guard or 
sound of a distant human voice does not qualify, and the increased use 
of modern technology (surveillance cameras, timed lights, and remote 
locks) . . . have only added to prisoners’ isolation.281 
As demonstrated by the science, extreme isolation and sensory deprivation measures 
put all inmates at a high risk of severe harm by denying basic human necessities. As 
demonstrated by the Britain, Maine, and Mississippi examples, such steps are also 
contrary to any legitimate policy goals. 
Whether “meaningful social relationships” are provided through regular 
counseling, group therapy, outside visitors, participation in rehabilitation programs 
that involve human interaction, or other forms of prisoner interaction should be left 
to state and prison authorities, within the bounds of what science continues to 
indicate is humane. Likewise, precisely how sensory-deprivation issues are 
addressed should not be dictated by the Constitution; given the current science, 
however, it is likely that prisoners are entitled to more time outside of the cell, some 
opportunity for meaningful participation in rehabilitative programs, and some time 
outdoors during daylight hours.282 
Finally, even under these improved conditions, solitary confinement should not be 
indefinite (which seems to needlessly add to a prisoner’s stress and risk of decline)283 
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or last for an unreasonable length of time. Studies have shown that even when there is 
not total isolation, increased time spent with a restricted group of people in restricted 
circumstances will increase the risk of deleterious effects.284 The Supreme Court has 
likewise acknowledged that “the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding 
whether the confinement meets constitutional standards.”285 
However, science currently provides no clear basis for setting a precise number 
of days that is too long. It has been established that seven days in isolation is 
sufficient to cause a decline in brain activity.286 “Mental health experts conclude that 
‘[n]o study of the effects of solitary or supermax-like confinement that lasted longer 
than 60 days failed to find evidence of negative psychological effects.’”287 And “for 
just about all prisoners, being held in isolated confinement for longer than 3 months 
causes lasting emotional damage if not full-blown psychosis and functional 
disability.”288 But these studies were not performed under the modified conditions 
that this Article argues are necessary to meet constitutional standards. The U.N. 
special rapporteur on torture, who advocates banning prolonged solitary confinement 
in the United States and elsewhere, admitted that he “more or less arbitrarily defined 
that as anything beyond 15 days.”289 
Rather than set an arbitrary number as a constitutional standard, states should 
evaluate the risk of physical and mental decline to their inmates given their own 
solitary confinement policies and set reasonable boundaries of which inmates are 
made aware. Inmates should know why they are being housed in restricted 
conditions, for how long, and any steps necessary on their part to achieve more 
freedoms. This would alleviate the unnecessary stress and increased risk of decline 
caused by indefinite confinement; it would also address due process concerns beyond 
the scope of this Article.290 
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These reforms would still allow great room for state experimentation without 
crossing the constitutional boundaries drawn by the Eighth Amendment. The reforms 
would also immeasurably improve the mental and physical health of inmates. The 
consequences of this improved health, as demonstrated by the Mississippi reforms, 
may include reducing prison violence and recidivism—thus promoting safer prisons 
and a safer public. By reducing the unnecessary use of solitary confinement through 
stricter time boundaries, states would also save money and save lives. 
